Charles Monroe v. Michael Bryan by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-29-2012 
Charles Monroe v. Michael Bryan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Charles Monroe v. Michael Bryan" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 799. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/799 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-206        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1627 
___________ 
 
CHARLES THOMAS MONROE 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL BRYAN 
 
Charles T. Monroe, 
 
                Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-01004) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 21, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 29, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
  
PER CURIAM 
 Charles Thomas Monroe appeals, among other things, the District Court’s denial 
of his motion for a preliminary injunction.  For the reasons below, we will summarily 
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affirm the portion of the District Court’s order denying his motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  We otherwise lack jurisdiction over the appeal.   
 On December 29, 2009, Monroe filed a complaint alleging that a corrections 
officer assaulted him and that the warden allows a pattern and practice of Eighth 
Amendment and Due Process violations.  On July 6, 2011, Monroe filed a motion for 
leave to amend this complaint.  Since his original filing, he has several times sought and 
been denied various forms of injunctive relief.  On December 28, 2011, he filed another 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  He alleges that he was assigned to a maximum 
security housing unit (“SHU”), where there is no opportunity for earning good time 
credit, in retaliation for filing complaints against prison officials.  In this motion he 
requested for the first time that the District Court order that he be reclassified to a lower 
level of security where there would be an opportunity to earn good time credit.  On 
February 21, 2012, the District Court issued an order in which it denied Monroe’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction, along with his motions for leave to file an amended 
complaint, to compel disclosure of medical records, and to appoint counsel.  On March 1, 
2012, Monroe filed notice of appeal.   
I. 
 We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the order to the extent it denies Monroe 
injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 
541 F.2d 365, 373 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a refusal to grant injunctive relief is 
appealable provided that the refusal is based on the merits of the case).  We lack 
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jurisdiction to the extent Monroe appeals the rest of the order.  See Enprotech Corp. v. 
Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 20-21 (3d Cir. 1993) (an order denying a motion to compel is not a 
final, appealable order); In re Kelly, 876 F.2d 14, 15 (3d Cir. 1989) (an order denying 
leave to amend is interlocutory not appealable); Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 
(3d Cir. 1984) (an order denying a motion for appointment of counsel may be reviewed 
only on appeal from the final judgment to be entered in the case).   
II. 
 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that requires the District 
Court to consider “(1) whether the movant has a reasonable probability of success on the 
merits; (2) whether irreparable harm would result if the relief sought is not granted; (3) 
whether the relief would result in greater harm to the non-moving party, and (4) whether 
the relief is in the public interest.”  Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 
2002).  We must determine whether the District Court “abused its discretion, committed 
an obvious error in applying the law, or made a clear mistake in considering the proof.”  
In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1357 (3d Cir. 1993).  In concluding that Monroe did 
not make the showing necessary for a preliminary injunction, the District Court neither 
abused its discretion nor clearly erred in applying the law or considering the proof.   
 The District Court was correct that Monroe’s allegations, taken as true, fail to 
create a plausible inference that his placement in the SHU inflicted an “atypical and 
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” and 
that he therefore has no protected liberty interest.  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
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(1995); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997).  Monroe has not shown that 
placement in the SHU lies beyond what a prisoner “may reasonably expect to encounter 
as a result of his or her conviction in accordance with due process of law.”  Fraise v. 
Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).  Monroe stresses that he 
has lost eligibility to earn good time credits.  He does not, however, allege that he has lost 
any good time credit that he has earned, let alone that “the State’s action will inevitably 
affect the duration of his sentence.”  Sandin at 487.  The alleged injury is “simply too 
attenuated.”  Id. 
 To the extent that Monroe seeks injunctive relief based on his allegations of 
retaliation, we note that the District Court’s order denied Monroe leave to amend his 
complaint to add such a claim; the Court stated that his avenue for relief was a new cause 
of action.  That portion of the order is not reviewable at this time, but we note that his 
motion did not articulate a substantial basis to support such a claim, let alone a 
preliminary injunction in this case.    
 Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Monroe has not shown that he 
is likely to succeed on the merits of his arguments.  Because we also agree that Monroe 
does not otherwise qualify for a preliminary injunction, we will summarily affirm the 
denial of injunctive relief pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  In all 
other respects, the appeal is dismissed.   
